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QUI TAM AND THE BANK SECRECY ACT:  A 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT MODEL TO 
IMPROVE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING EFFORTS 
Giovanni Scarcella* 
 
Cartels, terrorists, fraudsters, and other criminals face a problem:  when 
they receive the proceeds from their illicit activities, how can they get this 
money into their bank accounts without raising regulatory eyebrows?  The 
Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) has established a complex regulatory regime, 
imposing on banks the duty to assess the risks presented by their clients, to 
monitor the transactions they process, and to report transactions that contain 
indicia of money laundering and other criminal activity to the Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN).  In response, criminals utilize 
increasingly sophisticated means to obfuscate the origins of these 
transactions and disguise their illicit nature to enter the U.S. banking system.  
Banks thus face a difficult task standing at the front line of anti-money 
laundering (AML) detection.  Strong financial incentives for banks to neglect 
their BSA compliance function compound the difficulties innate to AML 
detection.  While banks are subject to regular examinations and face fines 
for failing to maintain adequate BSA compliance procedures, and while bank 
officials can even face imprisonment, the primary federal enforcement 
agency, FinCEN, faces perennial resource shortages.  Agencies must also 
consider a variety of factors when deciding whether to bring an action 
against a noncompliant bank.  The confluence of these issues leads some 
banks to ignore, neglect, or undermine their BSA compliance officials. 
This Note proposes a qui tam model within the BSA to provide recourse to 
bank BSA compliance personnel who have evidence of violations by their 
employers.  This model allows private individuals with knowledge of a 
violation to bring a claim on behalf of the government, while still providing 
for agency oversight through the ability to intervene in or dismiss cases.  This 
Note argues that qui tam will help increase the amount of BSA enforcement, 
ameliorate the resource shortages faced by FinCEN, and preserve regulatory 
discretion by allowing FinCEN to transition into a gatekeeper role.  This 
Note also discusses additional controls unique to the BSA to deter abuse and 
maintain effective BSA compliance departments at banks. 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2022, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2016, George Washington 
University.  Thank you to Professor Youngjae Lee and Alex Langsam for their guidance 
throughout the writing process and to the Fordham Law Review staff for their thorough 
editing.  I would also like to thank my family, friends, and especially Meline, for their endless 
support and encouragement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On July 6, 2020, the New York State Department of Financial Services 
(DFS) issued a consent order against Deutsche Bank AG (“Deutsche Bank”) 
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for deficiencies in its anti-money laundering (AML) program.1  Such an 
action would hardly have qualified as news—DFS had issued five such 
orders against Deutsche Bank in as many years2—if not for the parties 
involved:  Deutsche Bank continued to maintain client relationships with 
Jeffrey Epstein and related entities “despite repeated indications of 
facilitation of improper transactions.”3  Epstein, a financier who faced 
allegations of child trafficking and pled guilty to underage prostitution 
charges in 2007,4 maintained an account at Deutsche Bank from 2013 until 
2018.5 
The consent order describes a program that had all the trappings of an 
AML compliance function but with little buy-in from bank leadership.6  
Although a junior employee prepared a memorandum detailing the 
allegations against Epstein and his 2007 plea deal,7 a bank executive 
nevertheless approved Epstein’s onboarding without any review by the 
bank’s risk committee.8  Despite Deutsche Bank’s classification of Epstein 
as a high-risk customer,9 he and his representatives sent dozens of suspicious 
transactions to his alleged co-conspirators, as well as Eastern European 
women for “school tuition.”10  No minutes exist of a January 2015 risk 
committee meeting—in contravention of bank policy—where the committee 
determined the relationship with Epstein would continue.11  While the bank 
placed mandatory conditions on Epstein’s account to monitor for suspicious 
activity and reputational risk,12 these conditions were misinterpreted, or in 
some cases, never followed.13 
The DFS consent order did not address exactly why Deutsche Bank 
employees ignored the risks in continuing their relationship with Epstein, but 
emails quoted in the order provide some insight.  The relationship manager 
who onboarded Epstein emphasized the estimated cash flows of “$100–300 
million” that would stem from the accounts, with a possible revenue of “2–4 
million annually.”14  Subsequent to the January 2015 risk committee meeting 
where Deutsche Bank decided to continue its relationship with Epstein, one 
 
 1. See Consent Order Under New York Banking Law §§ 39 and 44, at 32, In re Deutsche 
Bank AG, et al. (N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Servs. July 6, 2020), https://www.dfs.ny.gov/ 
system/files/documents/2020/07/ea20200706_deutsche_bank_consent_order.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V2SM-V6LM] [hereinafter Deutsche Bank Consent Order]. 
 2. See Enforcement and Discipline, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., 
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/industry_guidance/enforcement_actions_lfs 
[https://perma.cc/UBD9-2R3H] (last visited Oct. 29, 2021). 
 3. Deutsche Bank Consent Order, supra note 1, at 3. 
 4. Id. at 4–5. 
 5. Id. at 4. 
 6. See id. at 6–15. 
 7. Id. at 6–7. 
 8. Id. at 7–8. 
 9. Id. at 8. 
 10. Id. at 9, 15. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 12–13. 
 13. Id. at 13–14. 
 14. Id. at 7. 
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member of the committee “noted a number of sizable deals recently” 
involving Epstein’s accounts.15 
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimates that up to $2 
trillion are laundered globally each year.16  Money laundering involves 
placing proceeds from unlawful activity into the banking system, separating 
these proceeds from their criminal origin (“layering”), and using seemingly 
legitimate transactions to disguise the true nature of these illicit funds 
(“integration”).17  Criminals use a variety of sophisticated methods to layer 
and integrate their illicit funds, putting financial institutions on the front lines 
of AML detection and reporting.18 
Federal statutes19 and regulations20 provide a set of requirements that 
banks must meet in their AML compliance programs.  The Bank Secrecy 
Act21 (BSA) is the primary federal statute governing such compliance 
programs.  Under this regime, banks’ AML compliance responsibilities 
generally fall within two categories:  reporting and due diligence.22  Banks 
that fail in their monitoring and reporting duties face civil and criminal 
liability.23  While Deutsche Bank paid a fine of $150 million and faced 
additional scrutiny by an independent monitor for its compliance violations, 
DFS, a state regulator, imposed these sanctions.24 
Despite these regulations, money laundering remains a serious problem.  
Approximately $800 billion to $2 trillion are laundered globally each year.25  
Offshore shell companies are used not only to evade taxes but to obscure the 
activities of criminal organizations and terrorist groups, as well.26  And the 
ramifications of money laundering include real human costs.  Epstein 
 
 15. Id. at 12. 
 16. See Money Laundering, U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS AND CRIME, https://www.unodc.org/ 
unodc/en/money-laundering/overview.html [https://perma.cc/WXN6-JLQZ] (last visited Oct. 
29, 2021). 
 17.  Steven M. D’Antuono, Section Chief, Crim. Investigative Div., Fed. Bureau of 
Investigation, Dep’t of Just., Statement Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs for Hearing Entitled “Combatting Money Laundering and Other Forms of Illicit 
Finance:  Regulator and Law Enforcement Perspectives on Reform” (Nov. 29, 2018) (on file 
with author). 
 18. Id. 
 19. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1786(q), 1818(s), 1829b, 1951–1959; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–1957; 31 
U.S.C. §§ 5311–5355. 
 20. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. §§ 1000–1099 (2021) (describing AML program requirements). 
 21. Pub. L. No. 91-507, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 12, 15, and 31 U.S.C.); see 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5355. 
 22. See Christina Parajon Skinner, Executive Liability for Anti-Money-Laundering 
Controls, 116 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 1, 3 (2016). 
 23. See Pamela H. Bucy, Epilogue:  The Fight Against Money Laundering:  A New 
Jurisprudential Direction, 44 ALA. L. REV. 839, 850–51 (1993). 
 24. See Deutsche Bank Consent Order, supra note 1, at 33.  Although Deutsche Bank 
incurred penalties for violating New York, not federal, regulations, these regulations require 
that banks comply with the BSA’s anti-money laundering provisions. See N.Y. COMP. CODES 
R. & REGS. tit. 3, § 116.2 (2020). 
 25. See Money Laundering, supra note 16. 
 26. See Carmine Franchesca S. Del Mundo, How Countries Seek to Strengthen 
Anti-Money Laundering Laws in Response to the Panama Papers, and the Ethical 
Implications of Incentivizing Whistleblowers, 40 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS., no. 1, 2019, at 87, 95. 
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sexually abused or trafficked dozens of victims, if not more.27  The program 
requirements banks must meet under the BSA are meant to deter such 
high-risk individuals from processing suspicious transactions through the 
U.S. financial system. 
Understaffed regulators, institutional decision-making by federal 
authorities, and the innate difficulties in money laundering detection all 
contribute to the gap between the extensive statutory and regulatory scheme 
and the continued shortcomings of banks’ BSA/AML compliance 
functions.28  Enforcement officials often point to resource shortages to 
explain why so few actions are brought.29  FinCEN has seen its budget slowly 
grow and its full-time staff decrease since 2013.30  Critics, including the 
Republican staff of the House Committee on Financial Services, have instead 
framed this issue as another flavor of the “too big to fail” problem—that 
enforcement officials at the U.S. Department of the Treasury (“the 
Treasury”) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) have declined to 
enforce violations of the BSA at large financial institutions precisely because 
of their size and “systemic importance.”31 
Investigating BSA violations takes significant time and resources even 
when regulators are monitoring attentively; for example, the Treasury’s 
$1 billion settlement with Standard Chartered resulted from a five-year 
investigation, even though a deferred prosecution agreement had given 
regulators increased visibility into its compliance program.32 
While the BSA imposes its requirements on banks through coercion—by 
duties to report suspicious activity or refrain from participating in certain 
transactions—until recently, the BSA provided little by the way of rewards.33  
Formerly, whistleblowers could only receive a discretionary reward capped 
 
 27. See How the Law, the Press and His Victims Finally Caught Up with Jeffrey Epstein, 
MIAMI HERALD (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/ 
article238237729.html [https://perma.cc/9YKS-68T3]. 
 28. See infra Part II.A. 
 29. See Skinner, supra note 22, at 5 (“[T]he problem is one of enforcement—that 
regulators lack the resources to monitor banks’ compliance with these regulatory 
requirements . . . or worse, bank managers choose to be willfully blind to obvious red flags.”); 
see also infra notes 128–32 and accompanying text. 
 30. Compare FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, PROGRAM SUMMARY BY BUDGET  
ACTIVITY, (2013), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/266/ 
12.%20FinCEN%20BIB%20FINAL%20ok.pdf [https://perma.cc/AB2S-XC3F], with FIN. 
CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, PROGRAM SUMMARY BY BUDGET ACTIVITY (2021), 
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/266/16.-FinCEN-FY-2022-BIB.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AQ34-3PV2]. 
 31. REPUBLICAN STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON FIN. SERVS., 114TH CONG., TOO BIG TO JAIL:  
INSIDE THE OBAMA JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S DECISION NOT TO HOLD WALL STREET 
ACCOUNTABLE 12, 33 (2016) [hereinafter TOO BIG TO JAIL]. 
 32. See Eric R. Havian & Michael Ronickher, The Need for Whistleblowers in AML 
Enforcement, BANKING EXCH. (Apr. 22, 2019, 11:01 AM), 
https://www.bankingexchange.com/news-feed/item/7852-the-need-for-whistleblowers-in-
aml-enforcement [https://perma.cc/R8YW-7XZF]. 
 33. See Bucy, supra note 23, at 852. 
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at the lesser of 25 percent of the criminal fine, civil penalty, or forfeiture 
collected, or $150,000.34 
These reward provisions paled in comparison to similar programs under 
other enforcement regimes.  The Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), for example, offers a mandatory reward of 10 to 30 percent of 
imposed monetary sanctions to informants.35 
Congress included provisions within the U.S. Department of Defense 
appropriations bill it passed for fiscal year 2021—the William M. (Mac) 
Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 202136 
(NDAA)—to “comprehensively update the BSA for the first time in 
decades.”37  The NDAA contains amendments to the BSA’s whistleblower 
program38 that are “substantially similar to”39 the Coordinating Oversight, 
Upgrading and Innovating Technology, and Examiner Reform Act of 201940 
(the “COUNTER Act of 2019”) modeled on the SEC’s program.41 
Would increasing the amount paid to informants really improve 
enforcement of the BSA?  Common sense suggests that increased 
whistleblower rewards will beget more whistleblowers.  Armed with more 
information on banks that neglect their compliance programs under the BSA, 
or worse, that willfully facilitate suspicious transactions, regulators will then 
bring more cases.  Still, this reasoning presumes that the Treasury lacks 
visibility into noncompliant financial institutions; yet, this is not wholly 
accurate, as banks are subject to regular examinations by federal banking 
regulators.42 
There are other ways to increase whistleblower involvement beyond 
simply increasing the reward amount.  The False Claims Act43 (FCA) 
includes qui tam provisions44 that allow private individuals to enforce its 
terms, with the government permitted to intervene in, or dismiss, claims.45  
Following amendments in 1986 that expanded the ability of private citizens 
to bring claims on behalf of the United States for fraud against the 
 
 34. See 31 U.S.C. § 5323(b), amended by William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 § 6314(a), Pub. L. No. 116-283, 134 Stat. 3388, 4597 
(2021) [hereinafter NDAA]. 
 35. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b). 
 36. Pub. L. No. 116-283, 134 Stat. 3388 (2021) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of the U.S.C.). 
 37. H.R. REP. NO. 116-617, at 2137 (2020) (Conf. Rep.). 
 38. See NDAA § 6314, 31 U.S.C. § 5323. 
 39. H.R. REP. NO. 116-617, at 2136. 
 40. Coordinating Oversight, Upgrading and Innovating Technology, and Examiner 
Reform Act of 2019, H.R. 2514, 116th Cong. § 206 (1st Sess. 2019). 
 41. See Havian & Ronickher, supra note 32. 
 42. See infra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 43. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733. 
 44. “Qui tam” refers to the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam pro seipso, 
meaning “he who as much for the king as for himself.” See infra note 88 and accompanying 
text. 
 45. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729. 
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government,46 the FCA’s qui tam model stimulated discussion about its 
benefits and shortcomings as a mixed public-private enforcement model, its 
potential for abuse, and its replicability in other fields of law.47 
If the BSA is not sufficiently enforced, then it will not be sufficiently 
complied with, as banks will face less deterrence against accommodating 
money launderers.  A qui tam model allows for greater enforcement of the 
BSA against recalcitrant banks by knowledgeable private attorneys general 
while still preserving a degree of regulatory oversight.  Furthermore, 
FinCEN’s low staffing levels suggests it is better suited for a gatekeeping 
function than as the primary enforcer of BSA actions. 
Part I of this Note introduces the AML laws, provides an overview of the 
BSA’s old whistleblower provisions and the NDAA’s amendments to these 
provisions, and presents the FCA’s qui tam framework.  Part II discusses the 
current gaps in AML enforcement and analyzes the efficacy of the NDAA’s 
newly enacted incentives, as well as the benefits and likely challenges in 
utilizing qui tam under the BSA.  Part III proposes a qui tam model for BSA 
enforcement, taking into account the specific limitations presented by the 
BSA and broader scholarly proposals to improve qui tam actions under the 
FCA. 
I.  THE BANK SECRECY ACT AND THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT:  TWO 
APPROACHES TO WHISTLEBLOWING 
This part provides an overview of the federal AML laws and how the 
NDAA amends these laws, focusing on the requirements that the BSA 
imposes on banks to create programs to monitor their transactions and 
customers, as well as the NDAA’s enhancements to the BSA’s whistleblower 
provisions.  This part then reviews critical reception to the SEC’s informant 
program to understand how similar strengths and weaknesses in the NDAA’s 
whistleblower enhancements may arise.  Finally, this part outlines the history 
of qui tam actions in England and the United States, particularly focusing on 
such actions arising under the FCA. 
A.  The Bank Secrecy Act Framework 
The primary federal statutes governing AML standards and enforcement 
are the BSA and the Money Laundering Control Act of 198648 (MLCA).49  
The BSA requires individuals, banks, and other financial institutions to keep 
records of and report certain transactions for suspected money laundering to 
aid criminal, tax, and regulatory investigations, as well as counterterrorism 
 
 46. See Christopher M. Alexion, Note, Open the Door, Not the Floodgates:  Controlling 
Qui Tam Litigation Under the False Claims Act, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 365, 378 (2012). 
 47. See David Freeman Engstrom, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement:  Empirical 
Analysis of DOJ Oversight of Qui Tam Litigation Under the False Claims Act, 107 NW. L. 
REV. 1689, 1690–91 (2013). 
 48. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.). 
 49. See Bucy, supra note 23, at 840. 
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efforts.50  The MLCA imposes criminal and civil liability on a party who 
engages in the act of money laundering—concealing proceeds derived from 
unlawful activity through transporting money between the United States and 
abroad or avoiding transaction reporting requirements.51  Crucially, the 
MLCA supplements the reporting and recordkeeping requirements of the 
BSA by requiring banks to establish procedures “reasonably designed” to 
ensure compliance with these provisions of the BSA.52 
The BSA also directs the president and relevant executive agencies to 
develop anti-money laundering strategies.53  Pursuant to this directive, the 
Treasury issues regulations that detail more particularized BSA compliance 
program requirements.54  Such regulations direct banks to, inter alia, 
establish a BSA compliance program,55 file Suspicious Activity Reports 
(SARs) when they detect violations of the BSA in the form of suspicious 
transactions,56 and conduct enhanced due diligence programs for high-risk 
correspondent accounts57 and private banking accounts.58 
Several government agencies have roles in implementing and enforcing 
the BSA.  FinCEN is a bureau within the Treasury that “issues regulations 
and interpretive guidance, provides outreach to regulated industries, supports 
the examination functions performed by federal banking agencies, and 
pursues civil enforcement actions when warranted.”59  Federal banking 
agencies—including the Board of Governors Federal Reserve System 
(“Federal Reserve”), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 
National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), and Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)—examine banks within their respective 
jurisdictions.60  States also maintain their own AML enforcement agencies, 
such as DFS in New York.61 
In practice, examiners from these agencies assess whether BSA/AML 
compliance programs include internal controls to ensure compliance, 
establish independent testing mechanisms, designate individuals responsible 
for compliance responsibilities, provide for training, and establish procedures 
 
 50. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5355. 
 51. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a). 
 52. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(s). 
 53. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5341–5342. 
 54. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. §§ 1000–1099 (2021) (requiring banks to, inter alia, conduct due 
diligence to understand the true owners of their customers’ accounts and report suspicious 
activity to the Treasury). 
 55. See 12 C.F.R. § 21.21 (2021). 
 56. Id. § 21.11. 
 57. See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.610 (2021). 
 58. Id. § 1010.620. 
 59. FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, BANK SECRECY ACT/ANTI-MONEY 
LAUNDERING EXAMINATION MANUAL intro., at 5 (2015). 
 60. Id. at 4–5. 
 61. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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for customer identification and customer due diligence, including 
compliance with beneficial ownership requirements.62 
The BSA imposes both civil and criminal penalties for violations of its 
reporting requirements.63  In criminal prosecutions, individuals—
particularly partners, directors, officers, or employees of financial 
institutions—face a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment and a 
$250,000 fine for willful violations of the BSA or related regulations, and 
financial institutions can face fines of $1 million per violation.64  The NDAA 
includes additional fines equal to the profit gained by a criminal violator, as 
well as a mechanism for financial institution employees to repay any bonus 
received to the financial institution if the employee committed a criminal 
violation.65  Civil penalties can reach $100,000 per violative transaction.66  
Under the NDAA’s amendments, repeat violators now face an additional 
civil penalty up to triple the profit gained or loss avoided by the violation or 
double the maximum penalty for the violation.67 
States also maintain anti-money laundering laws that carry their own 
penalties.  For example, New York law requires banks to establish 
anti-money laundering programs that comply with the BSA.68  Banks in New 
York that fail to comply with the BSA’s anti-money laundering provisions 
face fines or even revocation of their license by DFS.69 
The BSA formerly provided that a whistleblower whose information leads 
to a recovery greater than $50,000 may, at the secretary of the Treasury’s 
discretion, receive a reward of no greater than $150,000.70  The federal AML 
regime continues to bar government employees who provide information in 
the performance of their employment from reward eligibility after the 
passage of the NDAA.71  While the BSA had prohibited banks from 
discriminating against Treasury informants and provided a civil cause of 
action in the event of such discrimination,72 the NDAA repeals § 5328 and 
 
 62. See Assessing the BSA/AML Compliance Program Introduction, in FED. FIN. INSTS. 
EXAMINATION COUNCIL, BANK SECRECY ACT/ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING EXAMINATION 
MANUAL (2015). 
 63. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5321–5322. 
 64. Id. § 5322; see also 31 C.F.R. §§ 1010.820, 1010.840 (2021). 
 65. See NDAA § 6312, 31 U.S.C. § 5322(e). 
 66. See 31 U.S.C. § 5321. 
 67. See NDAA § 6309, 31 U.S.C. § 5321(f). 
 68. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 3, § 116.2 (2021). 
 69. See N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 39, 40, 44 (McKinney 2021). 
 70. See 31 U.S.C. § 5323(a)–(b). 
 71. Compare id. § 5323I (“An officer or employee of the United States, a State, or a local 
government who provides information . . . in the performance of official duties is not eligible 
for a reward . . . .”), with NDAA § 6314(a), 31 U.S.C. § 5323 (“No award . . . may be made [] 
to . . . a member, officer, or employee [] of [] (I) an appropriate regulatory or banking agency; 
(II) the Department of the Treasury or the Department of Justice; or (III) a law enforcement 
agency; . . . acting in the normal course of the job duties of the whistleblower.”). 
 72. See 31 U.S.C. § 5328. 
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requires that an employee alleging discrimination first file a complaint with 
the secretary of Labor.73 
B.  The NDAA’s Whistleblower Amendments 
As the NDAA reforms “the BSA for the first time in decades,”74 it offers 
a comprehensive set of changes addressing several facets of the BSA.75  
Among its notable provisions, the NDAA overhauls the BSA’s 
whistleblower program.76  In any “judicial or administrative action brought 
by the Secretary” or attorney general under the BSA that results in penalties, 
disgorgement, or interest exceeding $1 million, the secretary may award a 
whistleblower who voluntarily provided original information77 that led to the 
successful enforcement of said action up to 30 percent of the amount 
collected.78 
In determining the award amount within the above parameters, Congress 
requires the secretary to consider “the significance of the information 
provided by the whistleblower” to the action’s success, “the degree of 
 
 73. See NDAA § 6314(a), 31 U.S.C. § 5323 (prohibiting discrimination and requiring an 
individual alleging discrimination to “fil[e] a complaint with the Secretary of Labor,” but “if 
the Secretary of Labor has not issued a final decision within 1280 days of the filing of a 
complaint . . . and there is no showing that such a delay is due to the bad faith of the claimant,” 
allowing the claimant to sue in federal district court); see also id. § 6314(b) (“Section 5328 of 
title 31, United States Code, is repealed.”). 
 74. H.R. REP. NO. 116-617, at 2137 (2020) (Conf. Rep.). 
 75. See generally NDAA, Pub. L. No. 116-283, §§ 6001–511, 134 Stat. 3388, 4547–633 
(2021) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).  That many of these reforms 
are outside, or tangential to, the scope of this Note makes them no less significant in altering 
the landscape of the federal AML laws.  In addition to the changes discussed above, see supra 
notes 65, 67, 71, 73, and accompanying text, the NDAA “broaden[s] the mission of the BSA 
to specifically safeguard national security as well as the more traditional investigatory pursuits 
of law enforcement.” H.R. REP. NO. 116-617, at 2137.  The NDAA “requires more routine and 
systemic coordination, communication, and feedback among financial institutions, regulators, 
and law enforcement to identify suspicious financial activities.” Id.  The NDAA also 
“establishes a critical feedback loop and improved routine reporting requirements, to ensure 
that resources are directed effectively and that [the above stakeholders] better communicate 
and coordinate on BSA-AML priorities, collection methods, and outcomes.” Id. at 2137–38.  
The NDAA fosters this communication in part by allowing for greater data sharing among and 
within financial institutions and their affiliates. Id. at 2138.  In addition, following the passage 
of the NDAA, the secretary “must consider, when imposing SAR reporting requirements, the 
benefits and burdens of specific requirements and whether the reporting is likely to be ‘highly 
useful’ to law enforcement and national security efforts.” Id.  The NDAA also expands the 
coverage of the BSA to include the antiquities trade. Id.  Further, the NDAA adds $10 million 
to FinCEN’s budget and requires entities to report and disclose information regarding their 
beneficial owners to the Treasury. Id. at 2139.  The NDAA defines a “beneficial owner” of an 
entity as “an individual who, directly or indirectly, . . . exercises substantial control over the 
entity; or [] owns or controls not less than 25 percent of the ownership interests of the entity.” 
NDAA § 6403(a), 31 U.S.C. § 5336. 
 76. See NDAA § 6314(a), 31 U.S.C. § 5323. 
 77. The NDAA defines “original information” as information derived from the 
whistleblower’s “independent knowledge or analysis” not known from any other source and 
not exclusively derived from “an allegation made in a judicial or administrative hearing, in a 
governmental report, hearing, audit or investigation, or from the news media.” Id. 
 78. Id. 
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assistance provided by the whistleblower” and the whistleblower’s legal 
representative, the Treasury’s interest “in deterring violations” of the BSA, 
as well as additional factors the secretary “may establish by rule or 
regulation.”79 
In addition to the prohibition on awards to government employees,80 the 
NDAA also bars the secretary from awarding a whistleblower:  
(1) “convicted of a criminal violation related to the judicial or administrative 
action for which the whistleblower otherwise could receive an award”; 
(2) “who fails to submit information to the Secretary or the Attorney General, 
as applicable, in such form as the Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney 
General, may, by rule, require”; or (3) who knowingly and willfully provides 
false information.81 
The SEC’s whistleblower program provided the basis for the NDAA’s 
whistleblower amendments.82  Under section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), enacted in 
2010, Congress required the SEC to create a whistleblower program with 
rewards of 10 to 30 percent of the recovered penalty.83  While the NDAA’s 
whistleblower amendments largely mirror the provisions of the SEC’s 
program, they differ in one key respect:  the NDAA does not include the 10 
percent reward floor provided by the SEC’s whistleblower regime.84 
Prior to the 2010 legislation, the SEC expressed disappointment regarding 
the lack of success of its “practically unknown” whistleblower program, 
which only applied to insider trading violations.85  From the inception of the 
new regime in 2010 through September 2019, the SEC collected over 
$2 billion in sanctions from actions brought with information from 
whistleblowers and awarded approximately $387 million to sixty-seven 
informants.86  By December 18, 2020, that total ballooned to approximately 
$735 million awarded to 127 individuals.87 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 81. NDAA § 6314(a), 31 U.S.C. § 5323. 
 82. See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text. 
 83. See Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1841–48 (2010) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6). 
 84. Compare NDAA § 6314(a), 31 U.S.C. § 5323 (capping awards at “an aggregate 
amount equal to not more than 30 percent, in total, of what has been collected of the monetary 
sanctions imposed in the action or related actions”), with 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1) (providing 
for an award “not less than 10 percent” and “not more than 30 percent, in total of what has 
been collected of the monetary sanctions imposed in the action or related actions”). 
 85. See U.S. SEC, OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., ASSESSMENT OF THE SEC’S BOUNTY 
PROGRAM 4 (2010). 
 86. See U.S. SEC, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 1 
(2019). 
 87. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Issues Multiple Whistleblower Awards Totaling over 
$3.6 Million (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-325 
[https://perma.cc/9BZX-WQDB]. 
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C.  Qui Tam Actions and the False Claims Act 
Qui tam actions have existed under English and American law for 700 
years.  Today, qui tam provisions survive in the United States under the False 
Claims Act (FCA).  This section details qui tam actions’ rich history in the 
law, tracks their development into their modern form under the FCA, and 
explains how such actions are brought. 
1.  The Historical Foundations of Qui Tam 
Stemming from the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam pro 
seipso,88 qui tam actions have a long history rooted in both English and 
American common law.  Qui tam suits began in the thirteenth century in 
England as a way of bringing actions that combined public and private 
interests.89  Qui tam plaintiffs bringing such actions under the common law 
sued for both their private interest, as well as for the king’s interest.90  Private 
parties bringing qui tam actions under the common law fell into two 
categories:  (1) aggrieved parties suing for redress primarily because of a 
personal wrong committed against them and (2) informers motivated by 
recovering a portion of the penalty levied against parties for a private wrong 
that affected the king’s interests.91 
As common law qui tam actions became less common in the fourteenth 
century, the English Parliament began enacting statutes that allowed private 
parties to bring claims to address public wrongs.92  While some of these 
statutes required plaintiffs to demonstrate that they suffered injury, others 
allowed any informer to bring suit.93  Although these actions proved crucial 
to enforcing England’s penal laws in the absence of an adequate police force, 
outrage over abuse of qui tam actions by informers caused Parliament to 
place restrictions on qui tam from the fifteenth through seventeenth 
centuries.94 
By the time the American colonies adopted English law, significant 
confusion surrounded qui tam actions.95  Two forms of statutory qui tam 
actions were commonplace for both aggrieved parties and unharmed 
informers, who could receive remedies and a share of the penalty, 
respectively.96  These suits could be brought in civil or criminal 
proceedings.97  While no evidence suggests that common law qui tam suits 
could be brought in America, several colonies expressly adopted English 
statutes in their entirety, which allowed for qui tam procedures to enforce 
 
 88. “He who as much for the king as for himself.” Note, The History and Development of 
Qui Tam, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 81, 83. 
 89. See id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 84–85. 
 92. Id. at 85–86. 
 93. Id. at 86. 
 94. Id. at 86–88. 
 95. Id. at 91. 
 96. Id. at 90–91. 
 97. Id. at 91. 
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their provisions.98  Early American legislatures also passed statutes that 
permitted informers or aggrieved parties to sue qui tam, while other statutes 
provided rewards to informants without permitting informants to sue.99  By 
the end of the nineteenth century, as public agencies and law enforcement 
became more effective, legislatures and courts placed restrictions on qui tam 
provisions or removed them outright.100  In the presence of adequate public 
enforcement mechanisms, legislatures had little or no need for private 
individuals to enforce the criminal law by civil action, and such a regime 
conflicted with prosecutorial discretion.101 
2.  The Development of the False Claims Act 
By 1943, the only federal statute containing qui tam provisions still in use 
was the False Claims Act.102  Congress originally enacted the FCA in 1863 
at the height of the Civil War to incentivize fraudsters to inform on their 
coconspirators seeking to defraud the U.S. government as it handed out 
contracts to support the war effort.103  The FCA’s qui tam provisions allow 
private individuals with knowledge of fraud against the U.S. government to 
file lawsuits on behalf of the United States for violations of the FCA.104 
Congress amended the FCA several times between 1943 and 2010.  To 
limit abuse in qui tam suits, Congress amended the FCA in 1943 to bar suits 
“based upon evidence or information in the possession of the United 
States . . . at the time such suit was brought.”105  Yet, this limitation proved 
unworkable in situations in which states were required by statute to provide 
such information to the federal government, as it barred the state from 
bringing an FCA claim.  Where the federal government possessed 
information of a fraud, the qui tam informant plaintiff, known as a relator, 
who was the original source of this information, could not maintain an FCA 
suit.106  To correct this scenario, in 1986, Congress provided an exemption 
to the above bar under the FCA if “the person bringing the action is an 
original source of the information.”107  In the 1986 amendments, Congress 
intended to stem the recent increase in government-contractor fraud by 
providing the government with more effective tools and incentivizing 
whistleblowers to come forward.108 
 
 98. Id. at 94. 
 99. Id. at 95. 
 100. Id. at 101. 
 101. Id. at 101 & n.113. 
 102. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733; see also The History and Development of Qui Tam, 
supra note 88, at 100, 102 & n.116. 
 103. See Alexion, supra note 46, at 371. 
 104. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b). 
 105. Alexion, supra note 46, at 374 (quoting Act of December 23, 1943, 57 Stat. 608, 
recodified in 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4) (1982) (superseded)). 
 106. Id. at 375–77. 
 107. Id. at 378 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)). 
 108. Id. 
1372 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
With the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act109 
(ACA) in 2010, Congress again amended the definition of “original source” 
under the FCA.110  As of the 2010 amendments, an original source is one 
who:  (1) voluntarily disclosed the information prior to a public disclosure or 
(2) has independent knowledge of the publicly disclosed information that 
materially adds to this information and has voluntarily provided the 
information to the government before commencing the suit.111 
3.  The Current State of Qui Tam Actions Under the False Claims Act 
Under the current FCA, any person who defrauds the U.S. government is 
liable for a civil penalty of $5,000 to $10,000, plus triple the damages the 
fraud caused the government.112  The FCA tasks the attorney general with 
investigating violations.113  A person may also bring a civil action for 
violations of the FCA in the name of the government, which may be 
dismissed only with the written consent of the court and attorney general.114 
When a private individual files such an action, the complaint remains 
under seal for at least sixty days, during which time the government may 
decide to intervene and proceed with the action itself.115  If the government 
intervenes, it may prosecute the action, but it may also dismiss the claim or 
settle with the defendant without consideration of any objections by the 
relator and irrespective of intervention.116  While the relator may call 
witnesses and continue to participate in the litigation, the government can 
even impose limitations on the relator’s participation if the government 
demonstrates that such actions will interfere with its prosecution.117  The 
FCA requires the court to dismiss an action if 
substantially the same allegations or transactions as alleged in the action or 
claim were publicly disclosed—(i) in a Federal criminal, civil, or 
administrative hearing in which the Government or its agent is a party; (ii) 
in a congressional, Government Accountability Office, or other Federal 
report, hearing, audit, or investigation; or (iii) from the news media, unless 
 
 109. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of the U.S.C.). 
 110. Alexion, supra note 46, at 395. 
 111. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B). 
 112. Id. § 3729(a)(1).  The statute specifies six categories of fraudulent activity:  (1) false 
or fraudulent claims, id. § 3729(a)(1)(A); (2) false records or statement material to such 
claims, id. § 3729(a)(1)(B); (3) underpayment, id. § 3729(a)(1)(D); (4) delivery of false 
receipts, id. § 3729(a)(1)(E); (5) buying government property from an unauthorized 
government employee, id. § 3729(a)(1)(F); and (6) false or avoided payments to the 
government, id. § 3729(a)(1)(G).  The statute also imposes liability on anyone who conspires 
to commit any of the above violations. Id. § 3729(a)(1)(C). 
 113. Id. § 3730(a). 
 114. Id. § 3730(b)(1). 
 115. Id. § 3730(b)(2), (4). 
 116. Id. § 3730(c)(1), (2)(A)–(B). 
 117. Id. § 3730(c)(2)(C). 
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the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the 
action is an original source of the information.118 
The qui tam relator is entitled to 15 to 25 percent of the proceeds collected 
if the government intervenes and 25 to 30 percent of proceeds if it does not, 
plus fees and costs.119  In fiscal year 2019, whistleblowers filed 633 qui tam 
actions in which the DOJ recovered over $2.1 billion.120 
II.  CHALLENGES IN BSA ENFORCEMENT AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
This part outlines some of the issues in BSA enforcement that stem from 
both regulators and regulated parties and examines how changes to the BSA’s 
treatment of whistleblowers can ameliorate these issues.  After detailing the 
challenges present in BSA enforcement and compliance in Part II.A, Parts 
II.B and II.C assess the efficacy of the NDAA’s whistleblower enhancements 
and a qui tam model, respectively. 
A.  Gaps and Challenges in Bank Secrecy Act Enforcement 
Effective financial regulation requires accountability and buy-in from all 
parties:  regulators need to act when they identify misconduct, and regulated 
parties need to establish compliance programs that amount to more than just 
“window dressing.”121  Despite an abundance of regulations, the threat of 
fines or criminal prosecution, and an increasing number of examiners,122 
regulators face barriers to enforcement outside their control, including 
personnel limitations and resource shortages.123  When it comes to enforcing 
the BSA against the largest banks, however, regulators have been slow or 
reluctant to act.124  And even with effective enforcement, banks too often 
treat monetary fines as merely the cost of doing business.125 
 
 118. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(A).  The government may also oppose this dismissal to keep the 
relator’s claim in court. Id. 
 119. Id. § 3730(d)(1)–(2). 
 120. See Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Recovers over $3 Billion from 
False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2019 (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/ 
pr/justice-department-recovers-over-3-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2019 
[https://perma.cc/5F5W-232Q]. 
 121. Justin O’Brien & Olivia Dixon, The Common Link in Failures and Scandals at the 
World’s Leading Banks, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 941, 971–72 (2013) (discussing various 
financial crime failures at banks, including AML compliance failures). 
 122. Compare Occupational Employment and Wages May 2019—Financial Examiners, 
U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/oes/2019/may/oes132061.htm 
[https://perma.cc/3KZK-QV3Q] (July 6, 2020) (64,550 financial examiners), with 
Occupational Employment and Wages May 2018—Financial Examiners, U.S. BUREAU OF 
LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/oes/2018/may/oes132061.htm [https://perma.cc/UR9C-
4HUR] (Mar. 29, 2019) (58,590 financial examiners). 
 123. See O’Brien & Dixon, supra note 121, at 970; see also Skinner, supra note 22, at 5 
(“[T]he problem is one of enforcement—that regulators lack the resources to monitor banks’ 
compliance with these regulatory requirements . . . or worse, bank managers choose to be 
willfully blind to obvious red flags.”). 
 124. See TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 31, at 26–27, 39. 
 125. See O’Brien & Dixon, supra note 121, at 964. 
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1.  Enforcement at the Federal Level 
As this section sets out, evidence suggests that federal regulators have 
greater opportunity to enforce the BSA than current enforcement levels 
suggest.  The resulting underenforcement appears to stem from a lack of 
resources and a reluctance to hold larger financial institutions accountable 
due to concerns of the possible ramifications on the U.S. and global economy. 
a.  Indicia of Underenforcement 
Determining whether federal regulators and prosecutors underenforce the 
BSA against financial institutions with faulty compliance programs is a 
difficult analytical endeavor.  Such an assessment flows from the 
presumption that there exists some ideal level of enforcement—the number 
of civil and criminal actions needed to bring each bank’s BSA compliance 
function into conformity with federal regulations and standards.  Yet the gap 
between this ideal level of enforcement and the number of enforcement 
actions taken will always exist, and determinations of both how large a gap 
is acceptable and what an ideal enforcement environment looks like are 
subjective.126  Furthermore, overenforcement can occur when the 
implementation of the BSA generates more harm than necessary in achieving 
the goal of effective AML monitoring.127  With these caveats in mind, several 
factors indicate that federal enforcement authorities could be doing more to 
bring financial institutions into compliance with the BSA. 
First, comparing state enforcement of AML laws against financial 
institutions to federal enforcement helps contextualize the broader 
environment of noncompliance.  In 2016, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the 
Southern District of New York (“Southern District”) issued a press release 
detailing the Southern District’s impressive haul of approximately $12 
billion in forfeitures and civil actions from January 1, 2014, through 
December 31, 2015.128  Of this amount, only $2 billion stemmed from actions 
that included charges that certain banks violated the BSA.129  Over this same 
time period, available enforcement data indicates that FinCEN collected 
approximately $561 million in civil penalties for violations of the BSA 
 
 126. As Benjamin M. Lawsky, former superintendent of DFS succinctly explained, 
regulators “will always run slightly behind [financial firms]—it is just a matter of how far.” 
Benjamin Lawsky, Superintendent, N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., Remarks on Financial 
Regulation in New York City at Columbia Law School (Feb. 25, 2015), 
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/speeches/sp150225.htm [http://perma.cc/Z89X-26YJ]. 
 127. See Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L.J. 1743, 1744 
(2005).  Overenforcement of the BSA can occur, for example, when it actually undermines 
the valuable role banks play in monitoring transactions and customer behavior for money 
laundering. See infra Part II.C.2.c. 
 128. See Press Release, Justice Department, U.S. Attorney’s Offices, U.S. Attorney’s 
Office for the Southern District Of New York Recovers Nearly $12 Billion in Forfeitures and 
Civil Actions During Two-Year Period from January 1, 2014, Through December 31, 2015 
(Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/us-attorney-s-office-southern-district-
new-york-recovers-nearly-12-billion-forfeitures [https://perma.cc/5SFV-5BJ5]. 
 129. Id. 
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nationwide.130  In contrast, actions by DFS, a New York state agency with 
considerable jurisdictional overlap with the Southern District, returned about 
$7.4 billion in fines and restitution, with approximately $4.2 billion 
stemming from actions involving deficiencies in banks’ AML programs.131  
This discrepancy illustrates the more expansive landscape of BSA 
noncompliance that federal enforcement officials are missing.132 
Next, issues arising from agencies’ frequent use of deferred prosecution 
agreements (DPAs) in BSA enforcement, while by no means dispositive 
proof of underenforcement, can serve to illustrate some of the shortcomings 
of federal authorities.  A DPA is “[a] contractual arrangement between a US 
government agency . . . and a company or an individual facing a criminal or 
civil investigation.”133  The agency simultaneously charges the defendant 
and requests postponement of the prosecution so the defendant has the 
opportunity to demonstrate remediation of the alleged violations.134  DPAs 
typically include the imposition of fines, admission of relevant facts, and 
commitments to enter compliance with the alleged violation of law, 
sometimes overseen by an independent monitor.135  Of eighteen financial 
institutions that entered into DPAs for AML and sanctions violations since 
2010, four went on to violate the law again, and the government responded 
in two instances by simply renewing the DPA.136  These financial institutions 
 
 130. See Enforcement Actions, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, https://www.fincen.gov/ 
news-room/enforcement-actions [https://perma.cc/U26X-6ZW9] (last visited Oct. 29, 2021). 
 131. See Enforcement and Discipline, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., 
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/industry_guidance/enforcement_actions_lfs [https://perma.cc/DJ6R-
57GQ] (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).  This amount stems from consent orders entered into 
between DFS and:  (1) BNP Paribas (June 30, 2014); (2) Standard Chartered, New York 
branch (Aug. 19, 2014); and (3) Commerzbank AG (Mar. 12, 2015). See Consent Order Under 
New York Banking Law § 44, at 18, In re BNP Paribas, S.A. New York Branch (N.Y. State 
Dep’t of Fin. Servs. June 30, 2014), https://www.dfs.ny.gov/system/files/documents/ 
2020/04/ea140630_bnp_paribas.pdf [https://perma.cc/7X6C-MAH3]; Consent Order Under 
New York Banking Law §§ 39 and 44, at 3, In re Standard Chartered Bank, New York Branch 
(N.Y. Sate Dep’t of Fin. Servs. Aug. 19, 2014), https://www.dfs.ny.gov/system/files/ 
documents/2020/04/ea140819_standard_chartered.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4ML-P6QK]; 
Consent Order Under New York Banking Law §§ 39 and 44, at 16, In re Commerzbank AG, 
et al. (N.Y. Sate Dep’t of Fin. Servs. Mar. 12, 2015), https://www.dfs.ny.gov/system/files/ 
documents/2020/04/ea150312_commerzbank.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6QP-8EE2]. 
 132. While targeted cooperation between federal and state authorities may help explain this 
gap, the relationship between the Southern District—as well as the DOJ more broadly—and 
DFS has been marked not just by cooperation, but also by competition. See, e.g., Kenneth S. 
Rosenzweig, Note, Regulation of Foreign Banks Operating in the United States:  A State 
Regulator’s Controversial Pursuit of a London-Based Bank, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 
1021, 1032–34 (2013) (noting that DFS pursued regulatory action against Standard Chartered 
as DOJ decided not to file criminal charges); TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 31, at 20–21 
(observing that DOJ and federal regulators “scrambl[ed]” to complete their investigations of 
HSBC to ensure they would bring enforcement actions before DFS).  Federal authorities may 
also simply exercise more selectivity in their enforcement efforts. 
 133. THOMSON REUTERS PRACTICAL L., GLOSSARY:  DEFERRED PROSECUTION AGREEMENT 
(DPA) (2021). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See Jason Leopold et al., The FinCEN Files, BUZZFEED NEWS (Sept. 20, 2020), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/jasonleopold/fincen-files-financial-scandal-criminal-
1376 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
included major banks such as JPMorgan Chase & Co., Standard Chartered, 
Deutsche Bank, Bank of New York Mellon, and HSBC Bank USA 
(“HSBC”).137 
The case study of how HSBC entered into its DPA is instructive as to some 
of the issues commonplace in federal BSA enforcement.  In 2012, the U.S. 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations found that the OCC failed 
to correct problems in HSBC’s AML program despite conducting regular 
examinations.138  The subcommittee determined that this failure stemmed in 
part from the OCC’s decision to cite AML compliance failures as “Matter[s] 
Requiring Attention” instead of violations of law,139 its use of infrequent and 
compartmentalized examination procedures that did not account for the 
program as a whole,140 and its reluctance to use enforcement actions to 
prescribe informal remedies of identified problems.141  The subcommittee 
blamed OCC supervisors and enforcement, noting that examiners actually 
identified many of the problems in HSBC’s compliance program that 
enforcement officials declined to act on.142 
Later that year, HSBC entered into a DPA with the DOJ in which it agreed 
to pay $1.9 billion in penalties stemming from its “blatant failure to 
implement proper anti-money laundering controls [leading to] the laundering 
of at least $881 million in drug proceeds through the U.S. financial 
system.”143  Yet even this DPA included some controversy—DOJ continued 
to negotiate with counsel for HSBC well past the attorney general’s 
“take-it-or-leave-it” offer and deadline.144  The final DPA included revisions 
that shielded HSBC employees and executives from future prosecution for 
certain identified violations and left the door open for executives overseeing 
continuing deficiencies at the bank’s AML program to keep their bonuses.145 
Under the DPA, HSBC agreed to oversight by an independent monitor 
who submitted annual reviews of the bank’s AML program to prosecutors.146  
 
networks [https://perma.cc/3A36-N397].  Congress has appeared to take note of this issue, as 
under the NDAA’s amendments, repeat violators now face penalties triple the profit gained or 
double the maximum penalty. See NDAA § 6309, 31 U.S.C. § 5321(f). 
 137. See Leopold et al., supra note 136. 
 138. See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., U.S. 
VULNERABILITIES TO MONEY LAUNDERING, DRUGS, AND TERRORIST FINANCING:  HSBC CASE 
HISTORY 8 (2012). 
 139. Id. at 321–25. 
 140. Id. at 325–28. 
 141. Id. at 328–29. 
 142. Id. at 334. 
 143. Press Release, Dep’t of Just., HSBC Holdings Plc. and HSBC Bank USA N.A. Admit 
to Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Violations, Forfeit $1.256 Billion in Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement (Dec. 11, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hsbc-holdings-plc-
and-hsbc-bank-usa-na-admit-anti-money-laundering-and-sanctions-violations 
[https://perma.cc/DUS4-BUM7]. 
 144. TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 31, at 19–20. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See Spencer Woodman, HSBC Moved Vast Sums of Dirty Money After Paying Record 
Laundering Fine, INT’L CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Sept. 21, 2020), 
https://www.icij.org/investigations/fincen-files/hsbc-moved-vast-sums-of-dirty-money-after-
paying-record-laundering-fine/ [https://perma.cc/T5AC-4VC3]. 
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An investigation revealed, however, that while under monitorship and 
probation, AML compliance officers at HSBC faced serious obstacles in 
bringing the bank’s program into compliance.147  Former compliance officers 
maintained that HSBC did not give their departments sufficient time to 
conduct investigations, that non-U.S. HSBC branches often ignored requests 
for basic beneficial owner information about their customers, and that they 
had little power to close problematic customer accounts.148  These issues led 
to the filing of SARs that lacked basic identifying customer information on 
over 6800 transactions totaling $1.5 billion that were processed through 
HSBC’s Hong Kong branch, with $900 million of that total involving shell 
companies linked to criminal activity, as identified by the International 
Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ).149  Despite these and other 
issues, in 2017, the DOJ ended its DPA with HSBC, a move that “stunned” 
a former senior AML executive at the bank who believed issues at the Hong 
Kong branch—the “epicenter” of HSBC’s financial crime problems—were 
“largely untouched” while the bank was under monitorship.150  Enforcement 
data and the use of DPAs suggests that there is greater opportunity for federal 
authorities to prosecute banks for violations of the BSA, yet resource 
shortages and the decision to account for possible secondary effects of BSA 
enforcement limit prosecutors’ ability to bring actions. 
b.  Factors Underlying the Current Level of Enforcement 
Several reasons have been proffered by observers, regulators, and 
policymakers to explain underenforcement of the BSA.  Federal banking 
regulators face an “extremely broad expanse of issues,”151 and the BSA 
applies to a wide range of financial institutions.152  Yet, enforcement officials 
often face resource shortages,153 in the form of limited financial resources, 
staffing, and enforcement tools.154  FinCEN’s budget had only grown by 
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about 3 percent from 2013 to 2019, from $111.5 million to $115 million.155  
The budget for fiscal year 2020 provides a significant windfall for the 
agency’s resources:  $124.7 million—an 8.4-percent increase.156  In 
recognition of this, the NDAA provides for an additional $10 million for 
FinCEN’s budget.157 
Yet, FinCEN currently employs fewer full-time staff than it did in 2013.158  
As for enforcement tools, several observers have noted the sparse 
mechanisms that facilitate BSA compliance and have proposed several 
additional tools, including increasing enforcement against individual bank 
executives,159 regular auditing of banks’ AML software systems,160 
market-based creation of industry standards by private interest groups,161 and 
corporate codes of conduct for financial services akin to the concept of 
corporate social responsibility in the areas of labor and human rights.162 
Although some of the above resource limitations fall outside the control of 
federal enforcement officials, when authorities have identified and 
prosecuted violations of the BSA, the use of DPAs and non-prosecution 
agreements (NPAs) against large financial institutions has, at times, allowed 
banks and their executives to skirt responsibility for enabling or passively 
permitting criminals to launder money through their systems.  In testimony 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee, then–Attorney General Eric Holder 
observed in March 2013 that the DOJ found it difficult to prosecute large 
financial institutions when indications suggested that prosecution would 
negatively impact the national or global economy.163  Then–Treasury Under 
Secretary of the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen 
also testified that the DOJ asked the Treasury to assess the economic impact 
of prosecuting HSBC.164  Despite internal recommendations from DOJ’s 
Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section in September 2012 to pursue 
a guilty plea from HSBC,165 the DOJ entered into a DPA with the bank later 
that year.166 
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Dubbed “Too Big to Jail” by some observers,167 critics—including Judge 
Jed Rakoff of the Southern District of New York—see the overuse of DPAs 
as prosecutors letting banks off the hook for BSA violations.168  In Judge 
Rakoff’s view, such DPAs constitute “the cost of doing business rather than 
a real punishment,” and his “single greatest objection” to BSA enforcement 
is that the “ultimately responsible executives never get prosecuted at all.”169 
Congress continues to assess the propriety of DPAs and NPAs in enforcing 
the AML laws.  The NDAA’s amendments require the attorney general to 
submit a report to Congress every four years that lists the DPAs and NPAs 
entered into, the justification for each agreement, the factors accounted for in 
entering these agreements, and the extent of coordination between the 
attorney general and the Treasury in reaching these agreements.170 
Congress and the Treasury have created a complex and detailed regulatory 
scheme in the BSA.  In implementing this regime, enforcement authorities 
must “balance specific economic efficiency . . . and professional rights to 
self-governance with explicit requirements that society should not be held 
responsible or liable for the failures of the former.”171  How federal 
regulators decide to balance these concerns necessarily implicates the 
volume and kinds of claims prosecuted under the BSA.  Besides the extent 
of enforcement, challenges faced by banks also contribute to the limitations 
on BSA compliance. 
2.  Challenges to Creating a Culture of Compliance at Banks 
On the other side of the regulatory equation are the regulated parties.  The 
BSA predominantly utilizes coercion to compel banks to enforce its 
provisions—through duties to report suspicious activity or refrain from 
participating in certain transactions.172  By choosing the stick over the carrot, 
regulators have imposed on financial institutions the duty to police the 
activity of their clients and avoid transactions with some parties altogether; 
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thus, banks must spend resources on compliance functions, which may lead 
the bank to refuse certain transactions and even close certain accounts.173 
Financial institutions therefore have strong financial incentives—
particularly in the absence of sufficient enforcement—to underfund, 
understaff, or otherwise neglect or even undermine their BSA compliance 
function, even if it means an occasional fine.174  While HSBC forfeited a 
then-record $1.9 billion in its 2012 DPA,175 its global assets of over 
$2 trillion that year perhaps softened the blow.176 
Furthermore, the problems presented by this incentive structure are 
compounded at U.S. branches of global banks because such branches serve 
“as a gateway into the U.S. financial system.”177  Absent strong global 
governance, U.S. branches face significant challenges in processing 
transactions from affiliate branches that are located abroad with different 
AML and sanctions laws and that face less scrutiny and greater incentives to 
process violative transactions through their U.S counterpart.178 
B.  Evaluating the NDAA’s Whistleblower Enhancements 
As Congress modeled the NDAA’s additions to the BSA’s whistleblower 
provisions on the 2010 enhancements to the SEC’s whistleblower 
program,179 the critical reception to this program may provide some insight 
into the potential impact of the newly amended BSA on AML enforcement.  
The NDAA’s provisions differ from those found in the SEC program in one 
key respect:  the NDAA does not retain the 10-percent reward floor for 
informants.180  This difference grants the secretary greater discretion to 
provide lower rewards to informants in the BSA context than in the SEC 
program. 
Keeping this potential difference in mind, from a financial standpoint, the 
SEC’s whistleblower program revisions have been an enormous success.  
The program, formerly “practically unknown,”181 is now a mechanism that 
the SEC has used to collect over $2 billion in monetary sanctions since its 
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inception.182  Awards have been made in relation to a variety of violations, 
including tips about issuer reporting and disclosure requirements, offering 
frauds and Ponzi schemes, and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977183 
(FCPA) violations.184  The SEC’s increase in antiretaliation enforcement 
actions and efforts to prevent companies from placing restrictive 
confidentiality agreements on employees and other potential whistleblowers 
also suggest that the agency places high priority on the program.185 
The program, however, is not without its faults.  While whistleblower 
attorneys can help screen tips for meritorious cases,186 the SEC routinely 
receives thousands of tips, and only a small portion result in enforcement 
actions.  From August 2011 through 2019, the SEC received over 33,300 
whistleblower tips.187  Yet, only sixty-seven informants received awards—
totaling approximately $387 million—during this same time period.188  Such 
a high degree of meritless information may make the search for each credible 
tip more difficult, thus necessitating greater investment in enforcement 
staff.189 
Under the BSA, increased information provided by whistleblowers 
addresses only one side of the regulatory equation.  Money laundering 
detection is increasingly difficult, especially when regulators lack access to 
financial records in shell jurisdictions.190  Even within U.S. jurisdictions, 
compliance failures at banks can take years to root out.191  An increase in 
whistleblower tips will aid enforcement in the above situations, but what of 
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a scenario like the one Congress identified at HSBC?192  OCC examiners 
identified many of the problems at the banking giant over a six-year period, 
yet the OCC’s enforcement and supervisory arms failed to act.193  Though 
federal regulators face staffing shortages at the enforcement level,194 the 
same is not true of federal bank examiners tasked with reviewing financial 
institutions’ BSA compliance programs—in 2019, the government employed 
64,550 financial examiners, a 10-percent increase from the prior year.195  
This suggests that while whistleblowers under this framework will likely help 
glean more information from regulated parties, they will not substantially 
increase federal enforcement. 
C.  The Efficacy of Qui Tam Enforcement of the Bank Secrecy Act 
Following its groundbreaking investigation of money laundering and BSA 
compliance at major financial institutions, the ICIJ interviewed several 
industry experts who proposed a variety of reforms to combat money 
laundering.196  These reforms included empowering banks’ BSA compliance 
officers.197  Congress, too, appears in search of new ways to enforce the BSA.  
The NDAA establishes the Subcommittee on Innovation and Technology 
within the Treasury to “encourage and support technological innovation in” 
AML efforts and provides for the appointment of BSA innovation officers at 
banks.198  Qui tam actions can address both underenforcement by federal 
regulators and malfeasance or negligence by financial institutions by 
encouraging enforcement where regulatory resource shortages would 
otherwise prevent actions, empowering BSA compliance officials at banks 
by providing them a cause of action and incentivizing financial institutions 
to take their BSA obligations more seriously.  On the other hand, several 
barriers exist to simply importing the FCA’s qui tam provisions into the BSA, 
including the preservation of prosecutorial discretion, ensuring qui tam 
actions do not unnecessarily burden BSA compliance responsibilities, and 
maintaining confidentiality. 
This section will first examine some of the benefits and problems arising 
from qui tam actions under the FCA.  It will then analyze how qui tam 
provisions benefit BSA compliance and the issues posed by such a regime. 
1.  Critical Reception to Qui Tam Under the False Claims Act 
Qui tam actions under the FCA are now commonly brought—
whistleblowers filed 633 suits in 2019 leading to the recovery of 
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$2.1 billion.199  Although this data suggests qui tam has functioned as an 
effective mechanism for the government to recover significant funds lost 
through fraud by contracting partners, in-depth evaluations of qui tam 
consider not only the purpose that private enforcement serves but also the 
impact on the broader legal landscape. 
Recoveries through qui tam actions inherently include other costs, 
including the rewards given to informants and the impact of frivolous FCA 
claims on courts and the public.200  To wit, the government paid $265 million 
to whistleblowers in 2019,201 reducing the net gain to the government’s 
coffers to $1.835 billion.202  Evaluating other, more nebulous costs can prove 
difficult.  While private enforcement by relators saves taxpayer dollars by 
shifting litigation and detection costs onto private parties better positioned to 
monitor misconduct, and by providing resources unavailable to enforcement 
agencies, it can also disrupt public policy more broadly.203  As such, there is 
disagreement as to whether enforcement through a civil cause of action is 
more efficient than public enforcement on its own.204  For example, the cost 
efficiency of private actions may be outweighed by settlement agreements 
that do not consider the public interest.205 
In an attempt to quantify some of these costs, Professor David Kwok 
obtained raw data via Freedom of Information Act requests on qui tam 
actions from 1986 to 2009.206  Professor Kwok sought to determine the 
prevalence of frivolous FCA qui tam actions by identifying “filing mill” law 
firms—those firms representing qui tam relators with a high number of case 
filings but a low government intervention rate.207  Only two firms 
demonstrated a high number of filings, and only one of these firms filed 
claims that the government intervened in at rates lower than its average 
27-percent intervention rate.208  Furthermore, the data indicated that, as firms 
filed more qui tam actions, the government intervened at a higher rate, 
suggesting that experience improved firms’ ability to identify and present 
strong cases or that less successful firms stopped filing qui tam actions.209  
Professor Kwok also determined that the government does not frequently 
dismiss or delay its investigation of FCA cases.210  Ultimately, Professor 
Kwok concluded that most firms do not pursue a “low-effort, high-volume” 
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case strategy and recommended further case studies to validate his 
preliminary conclusions that the FCA’s qui tam provisions do not attract 
excessive litigation.211 
Another empirical analysis of FCA claims by Professor David Freeman 
Engstrom also determined that the DOJ rarely uses its authority to terminate 
qui tam actions brought by relators.212  Professor Engstrom, however, 
advocated for greater DOJ screening on the merits as opposed to 
interventions and terminations based on strategic concerns.213  In offering 
guidance to those seeking to implement qui tam in other areas, such as 
securities violations enforcement, Professor Engstrom posits several 
enhancements, including incentivizing the agency to play a greater 
gatekeeper role, reconsidering the FCA’s tiered bounty system so relators 
with strong cases and sufficient resources can bring actions without DOJ 
intervention, and mixing public and private enforcement instead of clearly 
delineating responsibilities between the two.214  Indeed, some evidence 
suggests that courts already interpret the DOJ declining to intervene as a 
signal that a claim lacks merit.215 
These analyses suggest that concerns over waste or abuse—while 
understandable given the historical prevalence of such issues216—are 
somewhat overstated, as DOJ intervention and dismissal rate data suggest 
frivolous claims are not brought frequently.217  At the same time, the DOJ’s 
rare use of dismissal and its low intervention rate can partly be explained by 
the agency’s consideration of strategic, rather than merit-based, factors, as 
well as the shortcomings inherent in the FCA’s incentive structure.218  The 
FCA, then, presents an effective, if imperfect, model that has led to an 
enormous financial return:  under the FCA, the government recovered 
$56 billion from 1986 to 2017,219 with a majority of this total coming from 
qui tam actions.220  Indeed, in contrast to whistleblowing regimes that 
provide only rewards, such as that at the SEC, qui tam claims are more likely 
to be meritorious and contain better quality information precisely because of 
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the costs of bringing a claim imposed on the relator.221  Although the qui tam 
model under the FCA holds promise as an effective tool to enforce the BSA, 
concerns particular to the BSA and maintaining effective AML enforcement 
must also be accounted for. 
2.  Potential Benefits and Challenges to Qui Tam Enforcement of the Bank 
Secrecy Act 
Despite a vast amount of literature on qui tam actions and several 
proposals to expand the use of public-private enforcement into other 
contexts,222 little has been written on the efficacy of qui tam in the BSA.  
Professor Pamela Bucy argues against qui tam provisions in the AML 
context.223  Much of Professor Bucy’s analysis, however, relates to a qui tam 
scheme that deputizes the bankers and professionals who deal directly with 
money launderers as private attorneys general to enforce the AML laws 
against their clients or business partners.224  Professor Bucy convincingly 
argues that such a regime would prove ineffective, as business incentives 
would lead potential relators to prioritize client relationships over BSA 
enforcement225 and because whistleblower protections in the AML context 
would not suffice to address the harm done to the business’s reputation.226 
But Professor Bucy’s argument speaks specifically to the applicability of 
qui tam in enforcing the AML laws against money launderers.  By contrast, 
this Note focuses on qui tam’s potential to help enforce the BSA against 
financial institutions lacking sufficient AML controls.  In this context, the 
potential attorneys general would primarily consist of bank employees, 
particularly AML compliance officials, enforcing the BSA against their 
employers—financial institutions who disregard or undermine their BSA 
compliance duties and allow money laundering to flourish.  This relationship 
between bank employee and employer better resembles the typical 
relationship between an FCA qui tam relator and defendant.227  As such, 
whistleblower protections will help compensate for some of the damage done 
to the employer-employee relationship.228  While Professor Bucy observes 
that a single whistleblower is less likely to offer sufficient proof of AML 
violations than an FCA relator due to the greater complexity of detecting 
 
 221. See Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Noise Reduction:  The Screening Value of 
Qui Tam, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1169, 1216–17 (2014). 
 222. See Engstrom, supra note 47, at 1691 n.6 (compiling articles proposing public-private 
enforcement regimes in securities regulation, environmental protection, civil rights, and tax); 
see also Zachary M. Dayno, Private-Citizens Policing Corporate Behavior:  Using a Qui Tam 
Model to Catch Financial Fraud, 43 VT. L. REV. 307, 333–49 (2018); Razon, supra note 189, 
at 347. 
 223. See Bucy, supra note 23, at 851–55. 
 224. Id. at 852. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 853. 
 227. Id. (“The qui tam plaintiff often will be an employee of the defendant and, it is likely, 
will have had a long-standing relationship which will be jeopardized by the qui tam lawsuit.”). 
 228. Id. 
1386 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
money laundering,229 BSA compliance staff are well positioned to evaluate 
their own employers’ AML shortcomings.  Financial institutions must 
maintain AML programs that designate individuals responsible for 
monitoring compliance with the BSA.230  This staff is directly responsible 
for monitoring transactions for suspicious activity and updating customer 
information to assess the risks customers pose.231  Financial institutions have 
strong incentives to stymie the efforts of their BSA compliance functions.232  
In such situations, BSA compliance staff need recourse to report wrongdoing. 
In addition to empowering BSA compliance staff and incentivizing 
compliance by regulated parties, qui tam also benefits BSA enforcement 
through decreased reliance on regulatory agencies to bring actions.  Private 
enforcement can provide additional resources and expertise through capable 
plaintiffs and circumvent regulators who are unwilling or unable to 
effectively police regulated parties.233  BSA compliance staff have the 
requisite expertise to understand a financial institution’s obligations under 
the BSA by virtue of their positions.  Moreover, qui tam provisions modeled 
on the FCA have the additional benefit of mixing a degree of public oversight 
with private enforcement.  However, issues arise in finding the right balance 
between the private enforcement goals of antiregulatory capture and cost 
saving and the public interest in effectively gatekeeping meritless claims.234 
Congress modeled the NDAA’s enhancements to the BSA’s whistleblower 
rewards on the whistleblower program at the SEC.235  Indeed, several authors 
have suggested improving the SEC program via the use of qui tam.  One 
observer has argued that a qui tam framework’s screening ability and its 
imposition of professional and personal costs would improve the quality of 
whistleblower information under the SEC’s program.236  Another scholar has 
proposed a modified qui tam model within section 922 of the Dodd-Frank 
Act.237 
Professor Bucy also raises other objections to a qui tam–style framework 
in AML enforcement that reflect broader concerns about private 
enforcement—namely, that such provisions remove prosecutorial discretion, 
deter systematic development of the law, and interfere with, or duplicate, the 
government’s ability to prosecute.238  These considerations, as well as more 
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specific issues, will help guide the following discussion of some of the 
limitations of adding a qui tam framework to the BSA:  specifically, ensuring 
relators’ suits do not preclude criminal enforcement, preserving 
confidentiality, and maintaining effective BSA compliance at banks by 
deterring abuse and circumvention of regular BSA compliance procedures. 
a.  Standing Issues and the Bank Secrecy Act’s Distinction Between Civil 
and Criminal Liability 
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of standing under the FCA in 
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens.239  
The Court had previously held that to establish Article III standing, a plaintiff 
had to show injury in fact, causation, and redressability.240  Thus, relators 
bringing suit under the FCA faced a potential standing problem in 
demonstrating injury in fact, as exemplified by the respondent in the case 
before the Court:  Jonathan Stevens only asserted injury to the United States, 
in the form of “injury to its sovereignty arising from violation of its laws . . . 
and the proprietary injury resulting from the alleged fraud.”241  Thus, the qui 
tam relator’s interest in recovering the bounty from a successful suit does not 
suffice to confer standing, as such interest bears no relation to the actual 
injury suffered by the United States.242 
The Court, however, upheld the standing of the qui tam relator under a 
partial assignment theory.243  Under this doctrine, the relator functions as an 
assignee of a claim stemming from an injury suffered by the assignor (the 
United States), and the assignor’s injury in fact confers standing on the qui 
tam relator.244  The Court further buttressed this reasoning by looking to the 
history of qui tam actions, finding that the historical prevalence of qui tam 
statutes permitting informers who had suffered no injury to sue demonstrated 
that qui tam actions constituted “cases and controversies of the sort 
traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process” under Article 
III.245 
Incorporating qui tam into the BSA presents similar issues in 
demonstrating injury in fact.  As one author argues, under the reasoning of 
Stevens, the government retains a partial interest due to the dual injuries 
suffered:  the injury to U.S. sovereignty stemming from the violation of its 
laws, which cannot be assigned, and the injury to U.S. proprietary interests 
stemming from the fraud, which is assigned to the relator.246  In the context 
of the BSA, the United States retains the same injury to its sovereignty due 
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to a financial institution’s violations of the BSA, but the equivalent 
proprietary interest transferred to the relator proves more difficult to discern.  
However, as the Stevens court observed, “[t]he FCA can reasonably be 
regarded as effecting a partial assignment of the Government’s damages 
claim.”247  As such, it appears that damages arising from BSA violations may 
be assignable. 
Qui tam actions may also conflict with the double jeopardy clause when 
not properly administered.  In United States v. Halper,248 the Court held that 
an FCA claim can give rise to a double jeopardy violation when a defendant 
who has been punished in a criminal prosecution is subjected to an additional 
civil sanction that is not remedial but instead serves as deterrence or 
retribution.249  The Court later abrogated Halper in holding that a civil 
sanction need not be solely remedial to avoid violating the double jeopardy 
clause and offered a list of factors to determine whether civil penalties were 
so punitive as to be criminal, rather than remedial, in nature.250  Because the 
BSA also provides for criminal and civil penalties,251 careful drafting and 
controls are necessary to ensure that a qui tam regime would not violate a 
defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights. 
b.  The SAR Problem:  Preserving Confidentiality 
Among the many requirements imposed on banks, the BSA requires that 
financial institutions “report any suspicious transaction relevant to a possible 
violation of law or regulation.”252  The statute also prohibits financial 
institutions and the government from notifying any party involved in a 
transaction that the transaction had been reported.253  Regulations go a step 
further in clarifying the scope and confidentiality of these SARs. 
Regulations issued by the Treasury require every bank to file SARs with 
FinCEN on transactions “relevant to a possible violation of law or 
regulation”254 or on transactions of $5,000 or more that “the bank knows, 
suspects, or has reason to suspect”:  (1) stem from or disguise illegal 
activities; (2) are designed to evade federal laws, regulations, or reporting 
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requirements; or (3) have no apparent business or lawful purpose.255  SARs 
form “the cornerstone of the BSA reporting system,” as U.S. law 
enforcement agencies utilize the information contained in SARs filed by 
banks to “combat terrorism, terrorist financing, money laundering, and other 
financial crimes.”256  The regulations prioritize maintaining the 
confidentiality of sensitive information contained in SARs:  if subpoenaed, 
financial institutions must decline to produce a SAR or admit that a SAR on 
a transaction had even been prepared or filed.257  Banks, however, may 
disclose a SAR to FinCEN, law enforcement agencies, state and federal 
authorities that administer examinations pursuant to the BSA, other financial 
institutions in preparation of a joint SAR, and banks may also disclose a SAR 
in connection with employment references or termination notices.258 
Consider a scenario under a qui tam action brought for violations of the 
BSA.  A bank files several SARs on Customer A over a short time period on 
the basis that the transactions involve shell jurisdictions and serve no clear 
business purpose, thus suggesting a high risk of money laundering.  In a 
monthly risk committee meeting, the committee decides to retain Customer 
A.  Subsequent to this decision, the bank processes more transactions from 
the customer, involving the same shell jurisdictions and similar indicia of 
money laundering.  These transactions are all flagged as high-risk by the 
bank’s transaction monitoring software, and several employees in the bank’s 
BSA compliance function recommend that a SAR be filed.  However, these 
recommendations are quashed at the highest levels of the bank.  A mid-level 
BSA compliance officer is rebuffed when the officer raises this issue with his 
superiors.  Eventually, the officer files a qui tam action in federal court 
alleging violations of the BSA related to these transactions and the bank’s 
lack of customer due diligence procedures.  How much of the above 
information from the SAR can the relator’s complaint include?  Enforcement 
by private attorneys general will thus implicate confidentiality concerns 
unique to the BSA’s compliance regime.259 
c.  Maintaining Effective Bank Secrecy Act Compliance 
Extending the authority to bring actions under the BSA to private attorneys 
general risks overenforcement.260  Qui tam may undermine BSA compliance 
by (1) pushing banks to file more defensive SARs that are less useful to law 
enforcement agencies or (2) pushing bank employees to file qui tam actions 
instead of adhering to bank BSA compliance procedures. 
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Overenforcement does not only refer to excessive sanctions, such as 
unjustifiably long prison sentences or high fines but also the secondary 
effects on the sanctioned party.261  In the context of BSA enforcement, 
reputational harm stemming from a criminal or civil investigation may cause 
a bank’s stock value to decline.262  In addition to such financial effects, 
termed “market spillover,” overbroad enforcement can capture conduct not 
justified by the purpose of the BSA, known as “definitional spillover.”263  
Still, some market spillover is justifiable.  If qui tam actions only resulted in 
fines, the deterrent effect would be weaker than if banks also faced 
market-based pressures for their BSA compliance failures and would 
“trivialize the normative message” that the BSA intends to convey—namely, 
that banks ought to maintain effective AML programs to assist law 
enforcement in detecting criminal behavior.264 
Qui tam enforcement of the BSA also implicates unjustifiable definitional 
spillover.  Banks already file “defensive SARs” out of an abundance of 
caution when the activity at issue raises few concerns, but to avoid regulatory 
action, the bank files a SAR with FinCEN.265  The quality of SARs is just as, 
if not more, important than the quantity of SARs filed, and evidence suggests 
defensive filing makes for weaker SARs and less effective AML systems.266  
FinCEN received over 2.3 million SARs in 2019, with over one million of 
these filed by banks.267  Law enforcement agencies should be able to utilize 
information in SARs to combat the underlying criminal activity, instead of 
wasting time and resources searching for substantive SARs that are buried 
like needles in a haystack of defensive reports.  Faced with the threat of qui 
tam actions if they choose not to file SARs on transactions that border on 
regulatory standards for suspicious activity, banks may elect to file reports 
anyway.  Increased enforcement of the BSA via qui tam actions could thus 
provide greater incentives for banks to file defensive SARs in the absence of 
demonstrated, robust public oversight of private actions. 
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At the other end of the spectrum, banks are a valuable source of 
information on suspected criminal activity when they comply with the BSA.  
An oft-cited criticism of qui tam is the potential for abuse.268  An undesirable 
result under the BSA would involve an employee bypassing a bank’s regular 
compliance procedures to file a qui tam action, thus burdening the bank with 
litigation in pursuit of a bounty instead of allowing the bank’s good-faith 
efforts to comply with its AML obligations to proceed. 
III.  A PROPOSED QUI TAM MODEL UNDER THE BSA 
The regulation of banks under the BSA is a complicated endeavor—one 
that involves regular reporting and reviews by banks’ BSA/AML compliance 
departments, regular examinations by banking authorities, and enforcement 
actions by a variety of federal agencies, most notably FinCEN and the 
DOJ.269  Bank compliance departments face a difficult task in monitoring 
transactions and customer accounts for suspicious activity and institutional 
risk, a task made all the more difficult when banks neglect, understaff, or 
override the recommendations of the compliance function.270  A small staff 
at FinCEN both reviews SARs filed by banks and sanctions banks when they 
fail to comply with the BSA.271  Furthermore, when FinCEN or DOJ 
enforcement officials weigh bringing civil or criminal actions against 
noncompliant banks, they consider not only the important role banks play in 
AML monitoring and the associated need to deter defensive SAR filings272 
but arguably the systemic economic effects that may result from such actions, 
as well.273 
A qui tam model addresses the above issues through its combination of 
private and public enforcement.  Qui tam would serve to empower bank BSA 
compliance officials—the people best situated to bring such actions by nature 
of their positions—at noncompliant banks.  Qui tam would also supplement 
understaffed federal agencies while preserving a greater degree of 
prosecutorial discretion than a purely private model.  However, simply 
transplanting the FCA’s qui tam model onto the BSA poses double 
jeopardy,274 confidentiality,275 and potential abuse problems.276  
Furthermore, much literature has examined and critiqued qui tam 
enforcement under the FCA; a model based on the FCA ought to draw from 
these critiques and not repeat the same mistakes.  This part incorporates the 
various benefits and limitations explored above into a functional outline for 
a qui tam model in the BSA. 
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A.  Revisions to the Agency Intervention Process 
Qui tam actions under the BSA should provide a longer time frame for 
FinCEN to decide whether to intervene or refer the case to the DOJ to 
prosecute the case criminally.  Under the FCA, the government has sixty days 
to intervene or allow relators to conduct the action on their own.277  The 
government can intervene in an action to prosecute the claim, dismiss the 
action, or settle with the defendant.278  Increasing the time frame for 
FinCEN’s initial decision to intervene in a BSA qui tam action accomplishes 
two goals:  (1) reducing the likelihood of a double jeopardy issue and (2) 
emphasizing the agency’s gatekeeper role. 
Unlike the FCA, the BSA imposes different degrees of civil and criminal 
liability depending on the mens rea of the violator and the particular statutory 
or regulatory provisions violated.279  Although the BSA permits the 
imposition of a civil penalty for the same violation that gave rise to a criminal 
penalty,280 qui tam actions could complicate such a scenario.281  Under the 
Hudson factors,282 the BSA’s civil penalties are likely to be found punitive 
in nature.  Many of the civil penalties articulated in the BSA require “willful” 
actions283 and thus “come[] into play only on a finding of scienter.”284  While 
the statute calculates some penalties based on the amount of the transactions 
that the bank processed in violation of the BSA,285 such a foundation does 
not make the penalties “remedial” in nature, given that the processed 
transactions do not constitute a loss to any single party in need of restitution.  
Furthermore, many of the civil penalties articulated under the BSA do not 
bear any relation to the amount of the transaction and merely serve to punish 
previous violators and deter future ones.286  Increasing the time for FinCEN 
to intervene can help assuage double jeopardy concerns by clearly 
delineating between criminal actions brought by the DOJ and civil actions 
pursued by FinCEN and qui tam relators. 
An increased intervention time frame that includes criminal referral serves 
functionalist ends, as well.  Qui tam actions would likely increase the amount 
of civil claims brought; such an increase in civil enforcement should not 
come at the expense of appropriate criminal enforcement, particularly in light 
of criticisms that enforcement authorities have been too lax in prosecuting 
BSA violations, as best exemplified in the HSBC case.287  Under an effective 
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private-public enforcement model, the regulators should instead leverage the 
increase in resources provided by private attorneys general to focus their 
enforcement efforts on prosecuting more egregious violations of the BSA and 
fulfilling their gatekeeper role in managing claims brought by qui tam 
relators.288  An increased time frame would allow FinCEN to protect the 
public interest through the termination of meritless or inefficient private 
actions and targeting potential criminal actions for prosecution by the 
DOJ.289  A qui tam relator whose claim is terminated and referred for 
criminal prosecution should still qualify as an original source eligible for a 
reward to incentivize such claims.  In such a situation, the NDAA’s 
whistleblower reward structure should control.290 
B.  Confidentiality Controls 
The gatekeeper agency should strive to keep confidential information 
under seal, while broadening the scope of permissible SAR disclosures to 
include qui tam relators.  Though current regulations call for sweeping 
confidentiality of SARs, banks may still disclose “[a] SAR or any 
information that would reveal the existence of a SAR” to regulatory and law 
enforcement agencies involved in BSA compliance.291  Banks also can 
disclose the “underlying facts, transactions, and documents upon which a 
SAR is based” to other financial institutions for the filing of a joint SAR.292  
Because a qui tam relator functions as an assignee of the government’s 
interests,293 for the purposes of SAR disclosure, it follows that the relator 
would be included among the parties to which banks, upon request or 
demand, could disclose a SAR.  Nevertheless, robust public oversight of qui 
tam claims includes ensuring the continued confidentiality of SARs where 
appropriate. 
In the first instance, a qui tam relator whose information includes, for 
example, a failure by the bank to file SARs or to offboard customers who 
engage in activity that has given rise to several SAR filings, will not be able 
to include a SAR itself among the evidence in the initial complaint.  If the 
relator serves, as is contemplated, as a BSA compliance official at a bank, 
the relator likely has “information that would reveal the existence of a 
SAR”294 or a contemplated SAR filing or “underlying facts”295 that 
supported or should have supported a SAR.  The statute and associated 
regulations should be amended to permit inclusion of such information in a 
qui tam complaint.  Additionally, the increased intervention time described 
in Part III.A will also provide FinCEN assistance here:  the agency must take 
care to ensure not only that meritorious claims stand but also that confidential 
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information therein remains confidential to protect possible future civil and 
criminal investigations into parties subject to SAR filings. 
C.  Restrictions on Permitted Classes of Qui Tam Relators 
The BSA’s qui tam provisions should incorporate the NDAA’s restrictions 
denying awards to certain classes of whistleblowers to the same classes of 
qui tam relators, as well as expand the kinds of relators that are prevented 
from bringing claims, to better deter abuse.296  The NDAA bars government 
employees—those convicted of related criminal violations, those who submit 
information by different means than regulations the secretary may 
implement, and those who provide false information—from receiving awards 
as whistleblowers.297  To prevent abuse, the BSA should prevent the same 
classes from bringing claims as qui tam relators. 
Furthermore, the qui tam provisions should also bar any bank employee 
who has failed to follow internal bank BSA compliance procedures from 
bringing a claim, provided these procedures constitute a good faith effort to 
comply with the BSA and do not merely serve as an obstacle to—or an undue 
burden on—potential qui tam actions.  Ideally, this restriction would curb 
abuse by preventing qui tam relators from end-running internal bank 
procedures for the reporting of suspicious activity. 
D.  Changes to the Qui Tam Reward Structure 
The incentive structure of the FCA that provides the relator with a greater 
percentage of the proceeds of the action or settlement if the government 
declines intervention than if it intervenes does not necessarily align with the 
strength of the claim.298  To incentivize greater agency participation and 
optimize the efficiency of the public-private enforcement mechanism, this 
Note adopts two revisions proposed by Professor Engstrom.  First, the tiered 
bounty system—originally devised to incentivize relators to bring claims that 
an overly cautious or captured agency would reject—has made it less likely 
for agencies to delegate enforcement to competent private attorneys general, 
thus undermining one of the principal benefits of qui tam enforcement.299  
Qui tam relators under the BSA should receive the same reward regardless 
of intervention by the agency.  Second, to engender the robust gatekeeper 
role required to allay the concerns discussed above, a qui tam model for the 
BSA should induce the agency to utilize its termination and intervention 
powers by holding the agency jointly liable for prevailing defendants’ fees in 
declined cases.300  Ideally, such provisions would incentivize competent 
private attorneys general to pursue meritorious claims without the need for 
agency resources, while inducing FinCEN to intervene and dismiss meritless 
cases. 
 
 296. See supra notes 71, 80–81 and accompanying text. 
 297. See supra notes 71, 80–81 and accompanying text. 
 298. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1)–(2); Engstrom, supra note 47, at 1752. 
 299. Engstrom, supra note 47, at 1752. 
 300. Id. 
2021] QUI TAM AND THE BANK SECRECY ACT 1395 
CONCLUSION 
This Note seeks to improve enforcement of the BSA.  The BSA has created 
a complex statutory and regulatory scheme that requires banks to maintain 
staff to monitor transactions for money laundering, report suspicious activity, 
and conduct due diligence on their customers.301  Despite the crucial role 
banks play in AML enforcement, FinCEN—the primary federal agency 
tasked with sanctioning banks that fail to comply with their BSA 
obligations—routinely faces staff and resource shortages.302  In addition, 
FinCEN and the DOJ have drawn criticism for several high-profile 
prosecutions that have ended in DPAs, and as some argue, less punishment 
than necessary to effectively enforce the BSA.303  Banks, for their part, 
sometimes neglect or undermine their BSA compliance staff.304  While the 
revisions under the NDAA represent a step in the right direction through the 
increase in FinCEN’s funding, the provision of greater rewards and guidance 
to the agency’s whistleblower program, increased penalties, and greater 
insight into beneficial owners,305 these provisions do not address instances 
where regulators have declined to bring down the hammer on banks that have 
violated the BSA. 
Against this backdrop, a qui tam model empowers BSA compliance staff 
by deputizing them as private enforcers and spurs increased enforcement, 
while retaining public oversight of these actions to ensure that only 
meritorious claims are prosecuted and that banks’ BSA compliance functions 
can still effectively operate. 
While this Note has attempted to anticipate some of the difficulties in 
adapting the FCA’s qui tam model to the BSA, further scholarship is 
necessary to examine the efficacy of this proposed model more fully.  
Similarly, more comprehensive data analysis is needed to determine whether 
current levels of enforcement are adequate to ensure compliance with the 
BSA.  Furthermore, this Note neither examines the validity of the “too big to 
fail” theory or potential resolutions to issues posed by financial institutions 
that have perceived systemic importance nor comments on the complications 
posed by state enforcement of the BSA.  These questions will no doubt affect 
federal enforcement of the BSA going forward.  This Note has hopefully 
added to the ongoing conversation about how to best prevent bad actors from 
utilizing the U.S. financial system to advance or profit from criminal activity. 
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